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Université du Québec en Outaouais
Quebec, Canada
Email: {riaz.shaikh, kamel.adi, luigi.logrippo}@uqo.ca
Serge Mankovski
CA Technologies
125 Commerce Valley DR W, Thornhill
Ontario, Canada.
Email: serge.mankovski@ca.com
Abstract—In enterprise environments, the task of assigning
access control rights to subjects for resources is not trivial.
Because of their complexity, distribution and size, access control
policies can contain anomalies such as inconsistencies, which can
result in security vulnerabilities. A set of access control policies
is inconsistent when, for specific situations different incompatible
policies can apply. Many researchers have tried to address the
problem of inconsistency using methods based on formal logic.
However, this approach is difficult to implement and inefficient
for large policy sets. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a simple,
efficient and practical solution for detecting inconsistencies in
access control policies with the help of a modified C4.5 data
classification algorithm.
Index Terms—Access control, Data classification, Decision tree,
Inconsistency, Policy validation.
I. INTRODUCTION
A set of access control policies is inconsistent when, for
specific situations, different incompatible policies can apply.
The problem of detecting inconsistencies has been studied
intensively in the access control community [1], [2], [3], [4],
[5], [6]. Most researchers have tried to solve this problem using
methods based on formal logic. However, this approach suffers
from exponential growth of computational complexity, as well
as difficulties with continuous values (for example time),
which are quite common in access control policies. Some
researchers have tried to address the issue of inconsistency
by adding special meta-rules in access control systems. For
example, in firewalls the rules are executed top-down and only
the first rule applicable is executed [7], later rules that may
contradict it are ignored. In XACML, conflict resolution meta-
rules (override) can be provided by the user: first override,
deny override, etc. However, the results of the application of
these meta-rules may not reflect the intention of the security
administrator. Therefore, potential inconsistencies should be
brought to the attention of the security administrator in an
efficient autonomic manner.
In this paper, we adopt classification techniques widely used
in data mining and in the machine learning community for
detecting inconsistencies in sets of access of control policies.
Several well known data classification algorithms exist, such
as ID3 [8], C4.5 [9], ASSISTANT 86 [10] etc. The C4.5 algo-
rithm is a state-of-the-art algorithm and one of the most widely
used in the machine learning community. We have chosen to
use the C4.5 algorithm in this work because of its ability to
handle both continuous and missing attribute values. In order
to detect the highest possible number of inconsistencies in the
access control policies, we have made modifications in the
standard C4.5 algorithm. We found that our proposed solution
is very efficient in detecting inconsistencies in various complex
scenarios. Also, our solution is simple and practical. To the
best of our knowledge, we are the first to use a modified C4.5
data classification algorithm to detect inconsistencies in sets
of access control policies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents related work. Section III contains formal definitions of
inconsistencies in access control policies. Section IV presents
the decision tree construction process. Section V describes the
proposed inconsistency detection method. Section VI shows
how to detect inconsistencies in various scenarios using our
proposed technique. Finally, Section VIII concludes the paper
and discusses future work.
II. RELATED WORK
Fisler et al. [11] have developed a software suite called
MARGRAVE for analyzing role-based access control policies.
This tool analyzes policies written in XACML format and then
translates them into multi-terminal binary decision diagrams
(MTBDD) to verify security properties. This is a very efficient
scheme, but its use with continuous values is not clear. In our
work, we use a data mining algorithm to generate decision
trees. Decision trees are different from binary decision dia-
grams (BDD) in many ways. Some of them are: 1) In order
to create BDDs, we need complete sets of policies; this is not
mandatory in the case of decision trees. 2) Because of the
first difference, BDDs do not provide efficient mechanisms
to detect incompleteness in sets of policies. 3) For BDDs,
the policies have to be encoded in terms of binary variables.
No such encoding is necessary in our case. 4) The MTBDD
technique does not provide a method for reducing the size of
policy sets. A separate algorithm is necessary.
Gouda et al. [7] have proposed a very efficient structured
firewall design method to prevent inconsistency, incomplete-
ness, and compactness problems. The policy administrator
needs to designs firewalls using firewall decision diagrams
(FDD) instead of simply generating rules in sequence as it
is usually done. This method eliminates the problem of incon-
sistency, which does not arise if a firewall is designed in this
way. Also, incompleteness does not arise since the syntactic
requirements of FDDs force policy administrators to consider
all types of traffic. However, for large scale enterprises, it may
be impossible for a policy administrator to design policies in
terms of decision diagrams manually and to take care of all
contexts to eliminate all possible anomalies. In enterprises,
policies can be generated and changed dynamically, therefore
inconsistency and incompleteness should be detected as they
are generated.
Some researchers [12], [13] have used formal verification
techniques such as satisfaction algorithms and the Alloy
toolset [14] for policy validation. For example, Hu et al. [12]
have proposed an approach for verifying formal specifications
of a role-based access control model and corresponding poli-
cies with selected security properties by means of SAT and
Alloy. Similarly, Mankai et al. [13] have proposed a method
that translates sets of policies written in XACML to the first
order logic modeling language Alloy, to detect and visualize
possible conflicts within set of access control policies. How-
ever, the use of Alloy presents some limitations [11], of which
the most important is the fact that the Alloy logic checker
requires that signatures be bound to small values, and so the
results may not be true in general. In addition, Alloy has severe
limitations for numeric values, which creates problems in case
of conditions involving hours of the day or monetary amounts,
among others.
III. CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS
In terms of data mining, access control rules are de-
scribed as ordered collections of attributes. These attributes
are classified into two types: 1) Non-category attributes and
2) Category attributes. Non-category attributes are decision-
making attributes, such as role, subject, location, time etc.
Each non-category attribute represents some important features
of a particular rule and contains some discrete or continuous
value. On the other hand, a category attribute represents the
class of the rule to which it belongs. Typically, a category
attribute takes only the values {Allowed, Denied}, perhaps Not
Applicable, etc.
We have a direct inconsistency when two rules present in
the same policy set lead to contradictory conclusions. For
example, suppose that one rule states that user x is allowed
access to resource r and another rule states that user x is
denied access to the same resource in the same context.
Formally, we can define inconsistency in following manner.
Let  be a set of rules ( = {R1, R2, . . . , Rn}), where
 = φ. All rules R ∈  have uniform structure, consisting
of a number of attribute/value pairs. This can be realistically
expected, if one assumes that default values can be used. Each
rule R ∈  comprises a set of non-category attributes A =
{A1, A2, . . . , An} and one category attribute C. Formally, a
rule Ri can be written as follow:
Ri : A1 ∧ A2 ∧ . . . ∧An → C
For example, consider the following rule.
R : role(Doctor) ∧ resource(Medicalrecord)∧
action(Write) → Allowed
In this example, Doctor, Medical record and Write operation
are the non-category attributes of the rule and Allowed is the
category attribute of the rule.
Let υ(Ri.Aj) denote the value assigned to an attribute Aj
in rule Ri.
Definition 1: Rules Ri, Rj ∈  are mutually inconsistent if
and only if
1) ∀Ak ∈ A υ(Ri.Ak) = υ(Rj .Ak) and
2) υ(Ri.C) = υ(Rj .C)
Informally, condition 1 in the above definition states that
all decision-making attribute-values of Ri are same as the
corresponding attribute-values of rule Rj and condition 2
states that the category attribute-value of rule Ri is different
from the category attribute-value of rule Rj . Note that we
assume that decision-making attributes will be in the same
order for all rules, a condition that can be easily satisfied.
We have an indirect inconsistency if two rules present
in different policy sets lead to contradictory conclusions.
Such inconsistencies are difficult to see because they may
be not visible at the time of defining policies and can be
triggered only when some specific event occur. For example,
Alice is allowed to create accounts and Bob is allowed
to delete accounts. A policy may state that create and
delete operation cannot be performed by the same entity.
Inconsistency could occur if Alice delegates her rights to
Bob. From the perspective of data mining, we can formally
define inconsistency in following manner.
Definition 2: Rule Ri ∈  and Rj ∈ ′ are mutually
inconsistent if and only if
1) ∀Ak ∈ A υ(Ri.Ak) = υ(Rj .Ak) and
2) υ(Ri.C) = υ(Rj .C)
IV. DECISION TREE CONSTRUCTION
In the standard C4.5 implementation, the process of de-
cision tree creation starts with a single node representing all
data [15]. If all cases in a data set belong to the same class then
the node becomes a leaf labeled with a class label. Otherwise,
an algorithm will select an attribute according to the following
criteria [16].
1) For each attribute A, find the normalized information gain
from splitting on A.
2) Let Abest be the attribute with the highest normalized infor-
mation gain.
3) Create a decision node that splits on Abest.
4) Recur on the sublists obtained by splitting on Abest, and add
those nodes as children of current node.
TABLE I
SAMPLE RULES
Subject Resource Action Permission
Alice File 1 Read Allowed
Alice File 1 Write Denied
Alice File 1 Delete Denied
Alice File 2 Read Allowed
Bob File 1 Delete Denied
Bob File 1 Write Denied
Bob File 1 Read Allowed
Bob File 2 Write Allowed
Let us assume that a data set S contains two classes P and
N . Then, the information gain for an attribute A is calculated
in the following manner [15]:
gain(A) = I(SP , SN )− E(A) (1)
Here, I(SP , SN ) represents the amount of information needed
to decide if an arbitrary example in S belongs to P or N and
E(A) represents the information needed to classify objects in
all subtrees. I(SP , SN) is defined as [15]:











where x is the number of elements in class P and y is
the number of elements in class N . Let us assume that
using attribute A as the root in the tree will partition S in
sets {S1, S2, ...Sv}. If Si contains xi examples of P and







I(SP , SN ) (3)
Let us assume that the policy administrator has defined the
rules given in Table I. On this policy data set, by applying the
standard C4.5 algorithm, we get the decision tree shown in
Figure 1(a). In this figure, one can see that the attribute that
provides the most information gain appears first in the decision
tree. Consequently, we always get optimized or compact trees
in which some attributes may not appear. However, we are
interested in to detect anomalies such as inconsistencies in
the policy data set. Therefore, all attributes must be present in
the decision tree so that we can get a complete picture of the
domain. Without having a complete decision tree, we may not
able be to detect all inconsistencies in the policy set.
V. INCONSISTENCY DETECTION STRATEGY
Our proposed inconsistency detection method consists of
the following two steps.
A. Step#1: Creation of complete tree
In order to assure that all attributes must be present in the




Fig. 1. Decision trees
For each attribute that does not appear already in the decision tree
2) Calculate the information gain that results from splitting on
that attribute.
3) Split on the attribute that gives the lowest information gain.
When we applied the modified C4.5 algorithm on the policy
data set of Table I, we get the decision tree shown in
Figure 1(b). In this figure, one can note that the attributes that
give the lowest information gain appear on the top. Because
of this we obtain a more complete tree as compared to the
standard C4.5 algorithm. Note that the subject attribute of
the policy does not appear in Figure 1(a). Having complete
decision tree is more useful for detecting inconsistencies in
access control policies as discussed in detailed in Section VI.
B. Step#2: Inconsistency analysis
In a decision tree, each branch bi (from the root to a terminal
node) represents one rule. In order to detect inconsistency,
we will apply Algorithm 1. First we check the terminal
node of each branch (Lines: 3-4). If any terminal node tnode
contains more than one category (C) attribute value (Line:
4), this means that some rules in the policy set are mutually
inconsistent. In order to determine which particular rules in the
policy are mutually inconsistent, first we fetch all the attributes
of the particular branch (Line: 5). After that the algorithm
will start searching the attribute-values in the actual policy set
(Lines: 6-10). All the rules in the policy set that contain those
attribute-values will be highlighted as inconsistent (Lines: 7-
9). If in a decision tree, no terminal node has more than one
Algorithm 1 Inconsistency Detection Algorithm
Input: Decision tree
Output: Context of inconsistency
1: Let A(bi) be the set of all attributes present in one branch.
2: Bool consistent = true;
3: for each branch bi in Decision tree do
4: if more than 1 category attribute is assigned to terminal
node bi.tnode then
5: A(bi) = fetch all attributes of branch(bi);
6: for each actual rule Ra in the policy set do
7: if υ(A(Ra)) = υ(A(bi)) then
8: Highlight: Ra : A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An → C;
9: end if
10: end for
11: consistent = false;
12: end if
13: end for
14: if consistent = true then
15: No inconsistency found;
16: end if
category attribute-value then this means that no inconsistency
has been found in the policy set (Lines: 14-16).
VI. DEMONSTRATION
In this section, we will discuss two scenarios. In the first
scenario, we demonstrate how to detect inconsistencies in a
single access control policy set. In the second scenario, we
will show an example of inconsistency detection in two sets
of access control policies.
A. Single Policy Set
Let us assume that we have one resource called medical
records. A sample policy set that includes five rules is given
in Table II.
TABLE II
POLICY SET FOR MEDICAL RECORDS
Role Location Time Permission
L1: General T1: 9:00-17:00 Allowed
ward T2: 17:01-8:59 Denied
Doctor L2: Emergency T1: 9:00-17:00 Allowed
ward T2: 17:01-8:59 Allowed
L3: Admin T1: 9:00-17:00 Denied
Office T2: 17:01-8:59 Denied
Lab staff - - Denied
Admin staff - - Denied
On this policy set, we have applied the modified C4.5
data mining algorithm to generate the decision tree. For this
purpose, we have used the Sipina data mining software pack-
age developed by Ricco Rakotomalala in the ERIC Research
laboratory [17].
The root node in Figure 2(a) shows that out of eight rules,
three lead towards the Allowed decision and five lead towards
(a) contains no inconsistency
(b) contains inconsistency
Fig. 2. Decision tree for medical record
the Denied decision. At the 2nd level of a decision tree,
we find that Lab Staff and Admin Staff are denied access
to medical records. The remaining six rules are associated
with Doctor. This node (Doctor) gives us the information
that in three contexts Doctors are allowed access to medical
records and in three contexts Doctors are denied access to
medical records. One can see that each terminal node contains
one non-category attribute value. This means that no direct
inconsistency exists in this policy set. Let us now assume
that the policy administrator adds the following new rule for
resource “medical records”.
R: Subject(Doctor) ∧ Location(Generalward) ∧
T ime(17 : 01− 8 : 59) → Allowed
In this case, we get the decision tree shown in Figure 2(b). We
see that two contradictory permissions (allowed and denied)
exist at a single terminal node (4th level, 2nd node from left).
This shows that two rules are mutually inconsistent in the
policy set. In order to point out which two rules conflict in
the policy set, we apply Algorithm 1. First we fetch all the
non-category attributes of the particular branch. In this case the
attributes are: Subject (Doctor), Location(General ward) and
Time (17:01-8:59). After that we start searching the policy
set. All the rules that contain the above mentioned attributes
will be highlighted. After reading the policy set of the medical
records, the following two rules are found to be in conflict:
R1:
Subject(Doctor) ∧ Location(Generalward) ∧
T ime(17 : 01− 8 : 59) → Denied
R2:
Subject(Doctor) ∧ Location(Generalward) ∧
T ime(17 : 01− 8 : 59) → Allowed
TABLE III
POLICY SET FOR WORKING HOURS
Subject Location Time Permission
Alice General ward 9:00-12:00 Allowed
Alice General ward 12:00-15:00 Denied
Alice Emergency ward 9:00-12:00 Denied
Alice Emergency ward 12:00-15:00 Allowed
Bob - - Allowed
Fig. 3. Decision tree for continuous & overlapping attribute values: Time
interval = 1.
So far we have only considered discrete and non-
overlapping attribute values. Let us assume that time is a
continuous attribute and its values are overlapping as shown
in Table III. By applying the modified form of the C4.5
algorithm, we get the decision tree shown in Figure 3. We
see that Alice is simultaneously allowed and denied to work
in the general and emergency wards at time 12:00. Note that
the C4.5 algorithm detected a split point in the time intervals
which are placed at the time 11.50, i.e 11:30 in the usual time
notation. This enabled the algorithm to detect two problems
for Alice at time ≥ 12.
B. Multiple Policy Sets
In this scenario, we will focus on detecting inconsistencies
between two different sets of policies. Indirect inconsistencies
can be not visible at the time of defining policies, since they
can occur after some specific event. For example, we have
the following set of policies.
P1: Administrator can read, write and delete database.
P2: Technician can read, and write database.
P3: Administrator can delegate his rights to technician.
So far, there are no conflicts in the above set of policies. A
conflict can occur, if the policy administrator introduces the
following requirement:
RQ1: Action delete can only be performed by administrators.
If a delegation occurs one can see that the technician
acquires the action delete through policy 3 which contradicts
requirement 1.




















help of data mining techniques. Let us assume that policy
1 and policy 2 are stored in the policy database shown in
Table IV.
According to requirement 1, only administrators are allowed
to perform action delete. This implicitly means that other users
who are not Administrators are denied action delete. These
constraints should also be stored in the policy database in the
form of rules as shown in Table V.
In order to find inconsistencies between authorization rules
and constraint enforcing rules, we have applied our proposed
strategy on the combined sets of policies of (Table IV and
Table V). After applying the modified C4.5 algorithm, we get
the following decision tree shown in Figure 4(a). One can see
that all terminal nodes have only one action class attribute.
This means that no inconsistency exists between authorization
rules and constraints enforcing rules. Let us now assume that
the administrator has performed the delegation operation. After
performing delegation, the Technician is allowed to perform
the following actions that are defined in Table VI. In order
to find inconsistencies after the delegation operation, we will
first combine all the rules defined in Table IV, V and VI
and then generate the decision tree. After applying the C4.5
algorithm (with enforcement of condition), we get the decision
tree shown in Figure 4(b). One can see that the Technician
is simultaneously allowed and denied to perform the delete
operation.
VII. COMPLEXITY
The order of complexity of the C4.5 algorithm is [18]:
O(m n log n) +O(n (log n)2)
where n is the size of the training data (in our case number
of rules) and m is the number of attributes. O(m n log n)
(a) Decision tree before delegation
(b) Decision tree after delegation
Fig. 4. Decision trees for multiple sets
represent the complexity for building complete decision trees
and O(n (log n)2) is required for sub-tree raising (prun-
ing). In our proposed inconsistency detection method, we
are only interested in building a complete decision tree. So
the complexity of our method for building decision tree is
O(m n log n). Figure 5 shows that when the number of
rules increases, the complexity of the proposed method also
increases linearly.
Fig. 5. Complexity of proposed method
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Many researchers have tried to solve the problem of de-
tecting inconsistencies in access control policies using various
methods, mostly based on formal logic. However, this ap-
proach suffers from exponential growth of computational com-
plexity, and cannot deal easily with numerical or continuous
values. In this paper, we have come up with a simple, efficient
and practical solution for detecting such inconsistencies. We
use a modified form of the C4.5 data mining algorithm that is
very efficient and has linear computational complexity.
In this paper, we have not considered situations in which
users belong to two or more groups or roles and by this
fact can be simultaneously permitted and prohibited to access
given resources, leading to conflicts. Detecting inconsistencies
in such situations is our next goal. We are also working
on techniques to deal with rules involving complex logical
conditions.
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